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Abstract
Two aspects of the physical side of the Church-Turing thesis are dis-
cussed. The first issue is a variant of the Eleatic argument against motion,
dealing with Zeno squeezed time cycles of computers. The second argu-
ment reviews the issue of one-to-one computation, that is, the bijective
(unique and reversible) evolution of computations and its relation to the
measurement process.
1 Introduction
It is reasonable to require from a “useful” theory of computation that any ca-
pacity and feature of physical systems (interpretable as “computing machines”)
should be reflected therein and vice versa.
The recognition of the physical aspect of the Church-Turing thesis—the
postulated equivalence between the informal notion of “mechanical computa-
tion” (algorithm) and recursive function theory as its formalized counterpart—
is not new [44, 42]. In particular Landauer, inspired by the books of Bril-
louin [7, 8] points out that computers are physical systems, that computa-
tions are physical processes and therefore are subject to the laws of physics
[28, 29, 30, 27, 31, 32, 33, 35, 34]. As Deutsch puts it [15, p. 101],
“The reason why we find it possible to construct, say, electronic cal-
culators, and indeed why we can perform mental arithmetic, cannot
be found in mathematics or logic. The reason is that the laws of
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physics ‘happen to’ permit the existence of physical models for the
operations of arithmetic such as addition, subtraction and multipli-
cation. If they did not, these familiar operations would be noncom-
putable functions. We might still know of them and invoke them
in mathematical proofs (which would presumably be called ‘noncon-
structive’) but we could not perform them.”
See also Pitowsky’s review [43].
The Computer Sciences are well aware of this connection. See, for instance,
Odifreddi’s review [42], the articles by Rosen [45] and Kreisel [26], or Davis’
book [14, p. 11], where the following question is asked:
“ . . . how can we ever exclude the possibility of our presented, some
day (perhaps by some extraterrestrial visitors), with a (perhaps ex-
tremely complex) device or “oracle” that “computes” a noncom-
putable function?”
Thus, it comes as no surprise that the Church-Turing thesis is under perma-
nent attack from the physical sciences. For just two such attempts in the recent
literature, we refer to the articles by Siegelmann [51] and Hogarth [23, 24].
Even more so, this applies to the weak Church-Turing thesis, often referred
to as “Cook-Karp thesis,” putting into question the robustness of the notion
of tractability or polynomial time complexity class with respect to variations of
“reasonable” models of computation. One particular famous contemporary case
is quantum computing. There, it has been shown that at least factoring may
require polynomial time on quantum computers within “reasonable statistics”
[50, 17].
We shall take out two examples of connections between physics and computa-
tion. First, we briefly review reformulations of Zeno’s argument of Achilles and
the Tortoise (Hector). This paradox purportedly seems to have been originally
directed against motion [36, 25, 20]. In this context it can be applied against
the uncritical use of continua and dense sets in general. Later on, we shall in-
vestigate reversible computations, more specifically computations corresponding
to bijective (one-to-one) maps and its possible connections with measurement
operations.
2 Infinity machines by Zeno squeezed time cy-
cles
In what follows, an oracle problem solver will be introduced whose capacity
exceeds and outperforms any presently realisable, finite machine and also any
universal computer such as the Turing machine. We follow previous discussions
(cf. [52, pp. 24-27] and [53, 56, 55, 54]).
2
Its design is based upon a universal computer with “squeezed” cycle times
of computation according to a geometric progression. The only difference be-
tween universal computation and this type of oracle computation is the speed
of execution. But what a difference indeed: Zeno squeezed oracle computation
performs computations in the limit of infinite time of computation. In order to
achieve this limit, two time scales are introduced: the intrinsic time scale of the
process of computation, which approaches infinity in finite extrinsic or proper
time of some outside observer.
As a consequence, certain tasks which lie beyond the domain of recursive
function theory become computable and even tractable. For example, the halt-
ing problem and any problem codable into a halting problem would become
solvable. It would also be possible to produce an otherwise uncomputable and
random output—equivalent to the tossing of a fair coin—such as Chaitin’s Ω
[12, 9] in finite proper time. We shall come back to these issues, in particular
consistency, shortly.
A very similar setup has been introduced by Hermann Weyl [58], which was
discussed by Gru¨nbaum [21, p. 630]. Already Weyl raised the question whether
it is kinematically feasible for a machine to carry out an infinite sequence of
operations in finite time. Weyl writes [58, p. 42],
Yet, if the segment of length 1 really consists of infinitely many sub-
segments of length 1/2, 1/4, 1/8, . . ., as of ‘chopped-off’ wholes,
then it is incompatible with the character of the infinite as the ‘in-
completable’ that Achilles should have been able to traverse them
all. If one admits this possibility, then there is no reason why a
machine should not be capable of completing an infinite sequence
of distinct acts of decision within a finite amount of time; say, by
supplying the first result after 1/2 minute, the second after another
1/4 minute, the third 1/8 minute later than the second, etc. In this
way it would be possible, provided the receptive power of the brain
would function similarly, to achieve a traversal of all natural num-
bers and thereby a sure yes-or-no decision regarding any existential
question about natural numbers!
See also the articles by Thomson [57], Benacerraf [1], Rucker [46], Pitowsky
[43], Earman and Norton [16] and Hogarth [23, 24], as well as E. W. Beth, [5,
p. 492] and K. Lo´pez-Escobar [38].
Let us come back to the original goal: the construction of a “Zeno squeezed
oracle,” or, in Gru¨nbaum’s terminology, of an “infinity machine.” As sketched
before, it can be conceived by considering two time scales τ and t which are
related as follows.
• The proper time τ measures the physical system time by clocks in a way
similar to the usual operationalisations; whereas
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• a discrete cycle time t = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . characterizes a sort of “intrinsic” time
scale for a process running on an otherwise universal machine.
• For some unspecified reason we assume that this machine would allow us
to “squeeze” its intrinsic time t with respect to the proper time τ by
a geometric progression. Hence, for k < 1, let any time cycle of t, if
measured in terms of τ , be squeezed by a factor of k with respect to the
foregoing time cycle i.e.,
τ0 = 0, τ1 = k, τt+1 − τt = k(τt − τt−1), (1)
τt =
t∑
n=0
kn − 1 = k(k
t − 1)
k − 1 . (2)
Thus, in the limit of infinite cycle time t → ∞, the proper time τ∞ =
k/(1− k) remains finite.
We just mention that for the model introduced here only dense space-time would
be required.
There is no commonly accepted principle which would forbid such an oracle
a priori. In particular, classical mechanics postulates space and time continua
as a foundational principle. One might argue that such an oracle would re-
quire a geometric energy increase resulting in an infinite consumption of energy.
Yet, no currently accepted physical principle excludes us from assuming that
every geometric decrease in cycle time could be associated with a geometric
progression in energy consumption, at least up to some limiting (e.g., Planck)
scale.
Nevertheless, it can be shown by a diagonalization argument that the ap-
plication of such oracle subroutines would result in a paradox. The paradox
is constructed in the context of the halting problem. It is formed in a similar
manner as Cantor’s diagonalization argument. Consider an arbitrary algorithm
B(x) whose input is a string of symbols x. Assume that there exists (wrong)
an “effective halting algorithm” HALT , implementable on the oracle described
above, which is able to decide whether B terminates on x or not.
Using HALT (B(x)) we shall construct another deterministic computing
agent A, which has as input any effective program B and which proceeds as
follows: Upon reading the program B as input, A makes a copy of it. This
can be readily achieved, since the program B is presented to A in some encoded
form #(B), i.e., as a string of symbols. In the next step, the agent uses the code
#(B) as input string for B itself; i.e., A forms B(#(B)), henceforth denoted
by B(B). The agent now hands B(B) over to its subroutine HALT . Then, A
proceeds as follows: if HALT (B(B)) decides that B(B) halts, then the agent
A does not halt; this can for instance be realized by an infinite DO-loop; if
HALT (B(B)) decides that B(B) does not halt, then A halts.
We shall now confront the agent A with a paradoxical task by choosing A’s
own code as input for itself.—Notice that B is arbitrary and has not yet been
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specified and we are totally justified to do that: The deterministic agent A
is representable by an algorithm with code #(A). Therefore, we are free to
substitute A for B.
Assume that classically A is restricted to classical bits of information. Then,
whenever A(A) halts, HALT (A(A)) forces A(A) not to halt. Conversely, when-
ever A(A) does not halt, then HALT (A(A)) steers A(A) into the halting mode.
In both cases one arrives at a complete contradiction.
Therefore, at least in this example, too powerful physical models (of com-
putation) are inconsistent. It almost goes without saying that the concept of
infinity machines is neither constructive nor operational in the current physical
framework.
Quantum mechanics offers a rescue; yet in a form which is not common
in “classical” recursion theory. The paradox is resolved when A is allowed a
nonclassical qubit of information. Classical information theory is based on the
classical bit as fundamental atom. Any classical bit is in one of two classical
states t (often interpreted as “true”) and f (often interpreted as “false”). In
quantum information theory the most elementary unit of information is the
quantum bit, henceforth called qubit. Qubits can be physically represented by
a coherent superposition of two orthonormal quantum states t and f . The
quantum bit states
|a, b〉 = a
(
1
0
)
+ b
(
0
1
)
= a|0〉+ b|1〉,
with |a|2 + |b|2 = 1, a, b ∈ C form a continuum.
Assume now that |0〉 = |1, 0〉 and |1〉 = |0, 1〉 correspond to the halting and
to the nonhalting states, respectively. A’s task can consistently be performed
if it inputs a qubit corresponding to the fixed point state of the diagonalization
(not) operator
D̂ = not = τ1 =
(
0 1
1 0
)
= |1〉〈0|+ |0〉〈1|.
That is,
D̂|∗〉 = |∗〉. (3)
The fixed point state |∗〉 is just the eigenstate of the diagonalization operator
D̂ with eigenvalue 1. Notice that the eigenstates of D̂ are
|I〉, |II〉 = 1√
2
[(
1
0
)
±
(
0
1
)]
=
1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉) (4)
with the eigenvalues +1 and −1, respectively. Thus, the nonparadoxical, fixed
point qubit in the basis of |0〉 and |1〉 is given by
|∗〉 = | 1√
2
,
1√
2
〉 = |I〉. (5)
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In natural language, this qubit solution corresponds to the statement that it is
impossible for the agent to control the outcome, since there is a fifty percent
chance for each of the classical bit states |0〉 and |1〉 to be “stimulated” at tA.
The impossibility of outcome control is indeed encountered in quantum mechan-
ics. Stated differently: at the level of probability amplitudes, quantum theory
permits a Zeno squeezed oracle. But at the level of observable probabilities, this
is exactly nullified, as the result of the computation appears to occur entirely
at random.
3 One-to-one computational paths and measure-
ment
The connection between information and physical entropy, in particular the en-
tropy increase during computational steps corresponding to an irreversible loss
of information—deletion or other many-to-one operations—has raised consider-
able attention in the physics community [37]. Figure 1 [35] draws the difference
between one-to-one, many-to-one and one-to-many computation. Classical re-
versible computation [28, 2, 18, 3, 35] is characterized by a single-valued inverse
evolution function. In such cases it is always possible to “reverse the gear” of
the evolution, and compute the input from the output, the initial state from the
final state.
In irreversible computations, logical functions are performed which do not
have a single-valued inverse, such as and or or; i.e., the input cannot be deduced
from the output. Also deletion of information or other many (states)-to-one
(state) operations are irreversible. This logical irreversibility is associated with
physical irreversibility and requires a minimal heat generation of the computing
machine and thus an entropy increase.
It is possible to embed any irreversible computation in an appropriate en-
vironment which makes it reversible. For instance, the computer could keep
the inputs of previous calculations in successive order. It could save all the
information it would otherwise throw away. Or, it could leave markers behind
to identify its trail, the Ha¨nsel and Gretel strategy described by Landauer [35].
That, of course, might amount to huge overheads in dynamical memory space
(and time) and would merely postpone the problem of throwing away unwanted
information. But, as has been pointed out by Bennett [2], for classical com-
putations, in which copying and one-to-many operations are still allowed, this
overhead could be circumvented by erasing all intermediate results, leaving be-
hind only copies of the output and the original input. Bennett’s trick is to
perform a computation, copy the resulting output and then, with one output
as input, run the computation backward. In order not to consume exceedingly
large intermediate storage resources, this strategy could be applied after every
single step. Notice that copying can be done reversible in classical physics if the
6
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Figure 1: The lowest “root” represents the initial state of the computer. For-
ward computation represents upwards motion through a sequence of states rep-
resented by open circles. Different symbols pi correspond to different initial
computer states. a) One-to-one computation. b) Many-to-one junction which is
information discarding. Several computational paths, moving upwards, merge
into one. c) One-to-many computation is allowed only if no information is
created and discarded; e.g., in copy-type operations on blank memory. From
Landauer [35].
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memory used for the copy is initially considered to be blank.
Quantum mechanics, in particular quantum computing, teaches us to restrict
ourselves even more and exclude any one-to-many operations, in particular copy-
ing, and to accept merely one-to-one computational operations corresponding
to bijective mappings [cf. Figure 1a)]. This is due to the fact that the uni-
tary evolution of the quantum mechanical state state (between two subsequent
measurements) is strictly one-to-one. Per definition, the inverse of a unitary
operator U representing a quantum mechanical time evolution always exists. It
is again a unitary operator U−1 = U † (where † represents the adjoint operator);
i.e., UU † = 1.
The no-cloning theorem [22, 60, 39, 40, 19, 11] prevents one-to-many op-
erations, in particular the copying of general (nonclassical) quantum bits of
information. Thus Bennett’s original strategy cannot be applied in the case
one-to-one computations or quantum computations.
In what follows we shall consider a particular example of a one-to-one de-
terministic computation. Although tentative in its present form, this example
may illustrate the conceptual strength of reversible computation. Our starting
point are finite automata [41, 13, 6, 47, 10], but of a very particular, hithero
unknown sort. They are characterized by a finite set S of states, a finite input
and output alphabet I and O, respectively. Like for Mealy automata, their tem-
poral evolution and output functions are given by δ : S× I → S, λ : S× I → O.
We additionally require one-to-one reversibility, which we interpret in this con-
text as follows. Let I = O, and let the combined (state and output) temporal
evolution be associated with a bijective map
U : (s, i)→ (δ(s, i), λ(s, i)), (6)
with s ∈ S and i ∈ I. The state and output symbol could be “fed back”
consecutively; such that N evolution steps correspond to UN = U · · ·U︸ ︷︷ ︸
N times
.
The elements of the Cartesian product S × I can be arranged as a linear
list of length n corresponding to a vector. In this sense, U corresponds to a
n×n-matrix. Let Ψi be the i’th element in the vectorial representation of some
(s, i), and let Uij be the element of U in the i’th row and the j’th column. Due
to determinism, uniqueness and invertibility,
• Uij ∈ {0, 1};
• orthogonality: U−1 = U t (superscript t means transposition) and (U−1)ij =
Uji;
• double stochasticity: the sum of each row and column is one; i.e.,∑ni=1 Uij =∑n
j=1 Uij = 1.
Since U is a square matrix whose elements are either one or zero and which has
exactly one nonzero entry in each row and exactly one in each column, it is a
8
δ λ
S\I 1 2 1 2
s1 s2 s1 1 2
s2 s2 s1 2 1
Table 1: Transition and output table of a reversible automaton with two states
S = {s1, s2} and two input/output symbols I = {1, 2}.
permutation matrix. Let Pn denote the set of all n × n permutation matrices.
Pn forms the Permutation group (sometimes called symmetric group) of degree
n. (The product of two permutation matrices is a permutation matrix, the
inverse is the transpose and the identity 1 belongs to Pn.) Pn has n! elements.
Furthermore, the set of all doubly stochastic matrices forms a convex polyhedron
with the permutation matrices as vertices [4, page 82].
Let us be more specific. For n = 1, P1 = {1}.
For n = 2, P2 =
{(
1 0
0 1
)
,
(
0 1
1 0
)}
.
For n = 3, P3 =



 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1

 ,

 1 0 00 0 1
0 1 0

 ,

 0 1 00 0 1
1 0 0

 ,

 0 1 01 0 0
0 0 1

 ,

 0 0 11 0 0
0 1 0

 ,

 0 0 10 1 0
1 0 0



 .
The correspondence between permutation matrices and reversible automata
is straightforward. Per definition [cf. Equation (6)], every reversible automaton
is representable by some permutation matrix. That every n × n permutation
matrix corresponds to an automaton can be demonstrated by considering the
simplest case of a one state automaton with n input/output symbols. There
exist less trivial identifications. For example, let
U˜ =


0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0

 .
The transition and output functions of one associated reversible automaton is
listed in table 1. Since U˜ has a cycle 3; i.e., (U˜)3 = 1, irrespective of the initial
state, the automaton is back at its initial state after three evolution steps. For
example, (s1, 1)→ (s2, 1)→ (s2, 2)→ (s1, 1).
The discrete temporal evolution (6) can, in matrix notation, be represented
by
UΨ(N) = Ψ(N + 1) = UN+1Ψ(0), (7)
where again N = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . is a discrete time parameter.
Let us come back to our original issue of modelling the measurement process
within a system whose states evolve according to a one-to-one evolution. Let us
9
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Figure 2: A system in a black box with an input interface and an output
interface.
artificially divide such a system into an “inside” and an “outside” region. This
can be suitably represented by introducing a black box which contains the “in-
side” region—the subsystem to be measured, whereas the remaining “outside”
region is interpreted as the measurement apparatus. An input and an output
interface mediate all interactions of the “inside” with the “outside,” of the “ob-
served” and the “observer” by symbolic exchange. Let us assume that, despite
such symbolic exchanges via the interfaces (for all practical purposes), to an
outside observer what happens inside the black box is a hidden, inaccessible
arena. The observed system is like the “black box” drawn in Figure 2.
Throughout temporal evolution, not only is information transformed one-to-
one (bijectively, homomorphically) inside the black box, but this information is
handled one-to-one after it appeared on the black box interfaces. It might seem
evident at first glance that the symbols appearing on the interfaces should be
10
treated as classical information. That is, they could in principle be copied. The
possibility to copy the experiment (input and output) enables the application
of Bennett’s argument: in such a case, one keeps the experimental finding by
copying it, revert the system evolution and starts with a “fresh” black box
system in its original initial state. The result is a classical Boolean calculus.
The scenario is drastically changed, however, if we assume a one-to-one evo-
lution also for the environment at and outside of the black box. That is, one
deals with a homogeneous and uniform one-to-one evolution “inside” and “out-
side” of the black box, thereby assuming that the experimenter also evolves
one-to-one and not classically. In our toy automaton model, this could for in-
stance be realized by some automaton corresponding to a permutation operator
U inside the black box, and another reversible automaton corresponding to an-
other U ′ outside of it. Conventionally, U and U ′ correspond to the measured
system and the measurement device, respectively.
In such a case, as there is no copying due to one-to-one evolution, in or-
der to set back the system to its original initial state, the experimenter would
have to erase all knowledge bits of information acquired so far. The experi-
ment would have to evolve back to the initial state of the measurement device
and the measured system prior to the measurement. As a result, the repre-
sentation of measurement results in one-to-one reversible systems may cause a
sort of complementarity due to the impossibility to measure all variants of the
representation at once.
Let us give a brief example. Consider the 6× 6 permutation matrix
U =


0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0


corresponding to a reversible 3-state automaton with two input/output symbols
1, 2. listed in table 2. The evolution is

(s1, 1)
(s1, 2)
(s2, 1)
(s2, 2)
(s3, 1)
(s3, 2)


U−→


(s1, 2)
(s3, 2)
(s2, 1)
(s1, 1)
(s3, 1)
(s2, 2)


U−→


(s3, 2)
(s2, 2)
(s2, 1)
(s1, 2)
(s3, 1)
(s1, 1)


U−→


(s2, 2)
(s1, 1)
(s2, 1)
(s3, 2)
(s3, 1)
(s1, 2)


U−→


(s1, 1)
(s1, 2)
(s2, 1)
(s2, 2)
(s3, 1)
(s3, 2)


.
Thus after the input of just one symbol, the automaton states can be grouped
into experimental equivalence classes [52]
v(1) = {{1}, {2, 3}}, v(2) = {{1, 3}, {2}}.
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δ λ
S\I 1 2 1 2
s1 s1 s3 2 2
s2 s2 s1 1 1
s3 s3 s2 1 2
Table 2: Transition and output table of a reversible automaton with three states
S = {s1, s2, s3} and two input/output symbols I = {1, 2}.
The associated partition logic corresponds to a non Boolean (nondistributive)
partition logic isomorphic to MO2. Of course, if one develops the automaton
further, then, for instance, v(2222) = {{1}, {2}, {3}} and the classical case is
recovered [notice that this is not the case for v(
·
1) = v(1)]. Yet, if one assumes
that the output is channelled into the interface after only a single evolution step
(and that afterwards the evolution is via another U ′), the nonclassical feature
pertains despite the bijective character of the evolution.
What has been discussed above is very similar to the opening, closing and
reopening of Schro¨dinger’s catalogue of expectation values [48, p. 53]: At least
up to a certain magnitude of complexity—any measurement can be “undone”
by a proper reconstruction of the wave-function. A necessary condition for this
to happen is that all information about the original measurement is lost. In
Schro¨dinger’s terms, the prediction catalog (the wave function) can be opened
only at one particular page. We may close the prediction catalog before reading
this page. Then we can open the prediction catalog at another, complemen-
tary, page again. By no way we can open the prediction catalog at one page,
read and (irreversible) memorize the page, close it; then open it at another,
complementary, page. (Two noncomplementary pages which correspond to two
co-measurable observables can be read simultaneously.)
From this point of view, it appears that, strictly speaking, irreversibility
may turn out to be an inappropriate concept both in computational universes
generated by one-to-one evolution as well as for quantum measurement theory.
Indeed, irreversibility may have been imposed upon the measurement process
rather heuristically and artificially to express the huge practical difficulties as-
sociated with any backward evolution, with “reversing the gear”, or with re-
constructing a coherent state. To quote Landauer [32, section 2], “What is
measurement? If it is simply information transfer, that is done all the time
inside the computer, and can be done with arbitrary little dissipation.” And,
one may add, without destroying coherence.
Let us conclude with a metaphysical speculation. In a one-to-one invertible
universe, any evolution, any step of computation, any single measurement act
reminds us of a permanent permutation, reformulation and reiteration of one
12
and the same “message”—a “message” that was there already at beginning of
the universe, which gets transformed but is neither destroyed nor renewed. This
thought might be very close to what Schro¨dinger had in mind when contem-
plating about Vedic philosophy [49].
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